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Chapter 6Defense Contracting Rip-Off |
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Before I proceed to inform the American people about the dastardly
way in which the defense contracting business rips off the government and the
taxpayer, let me explain my credentials for this critical evaluation. I spent
over 17 years in the defense contracting business as a draftsman, design
engineer, supervisor, systems engineer, a manager for a major aerospace firm,
and as the Assistant Program Manager/Proposal Manager on a multi-billion
dollar U. S. Navy shipbuilding contract. I have the unique perspective that I have spent one-half
of my professional life in defense contracting work and one-half in the
private sector. It most certainly opens your eyes as to how projects and
taxpayer versus consumer dollars should and should not be managed. Defense contracting is just one aspect of Congress’ total
disregard for taxpayer dollars. The situation can be summed up in one brief
phrase, “The government and Congress is not accountable to the American
people.” If the defense contractors
had to sit before an audience of a few hundred average American taxpayers to
justify the costs of one of these obscenely inflated programs, the defense
contractor management would be lucky if they left the room with their skin
intact. My First Encounter With the Aerospace IndustryI accepted employment for a major defense contractor in
the early 1970s after I had been discharged from the Army. I moved to
California to take a job with the hope of starting a new career. Working in
California was a complete revelation to me as I had previously worked in a
boiler room type operation in New York City. Our drawing boards were made
from old doors. There were no frills, no air conditioning, and no “break”
rooms; not even a coffee maker. If you had a friendly conversation that
lasted more than 5 minutes, you were severely chastised. The environment was
all work and no play. We quietly made jokes about the head slave master who
beat a constant rhythm on his kettledrums to the tune of “draw, draw, draw!”
In contrast, the “enlightened” California environment was so friendly and
laid back. It was a refreshing change from my worker bee’s viewpoint but I
could not envision how any work was accomplished. The sparkling new buildings
we worked in, plus the seemingly endless flow of money, was initially refreshing
until I examined the culture more closely. Before I cut any deeper, let me offer the obligatory
apologies to the small percentage of defense workers I have had the pleasure
to work with who actually exhibited superior work habits. After I had worked in California for a few months at a job
in which chaos reigned supreme, my manager asked me if I would be interested
in working in a new group that would attempt to automate the ship’s drawings
via computer, since I was one of the few employees with a computer education.
I was thrilled and accepted immediately. My company had hired McDonnell
Douglas Automation in Long Beach, California to get the ball rolling. Today
Computer-Aided Design (CAD) is a household word in the engineering community,
but in those days it was non-existent.
I visualized myself working on the cutting edge of technology. Another employee and I were sent to McDonnell-Douglas
Automation on a fact-finding mission. We were greeted by a manager and
escorted through the main engineering room to a conference room. This massive
room must have held 200 drawing boards. I could not help but notice that only
one board was occupied by an engineer who was actually working. The rest of
the employees were standing around the coffee machine or just chatting away
in the hallways. I asked the manager if we had interrupted the engineers
while they were on coffee break. He gave me a quizzical look and stated that
“No, it was just the normal workday.”
This was my introduction to the California defense contracting
business. I should note that when I left the facility, I believe I saw three
people with their noses down on the drawing board – a vast improvement. Now I know that the California work environment has been
dubbed “manana” (tomorrow) in Spanish, but I could not believe that this work
attitude I was witnessing was the norm. I would be proven wrong. The defense
aerospace industry has degenerated into the largest Works Progress
Administration (WPA) program in American history rife with inefficiency
usurping any of the programs initiated by Franklin Delano Roosevelt, which
I’m sure were a model of efficiency in comparison. The sloppy work habits all
started during World War II when the government threw its entire resources
into building fighter aircraft. Cost
was not the issue – just get the planes built – which leads to unacceptable
inefficiencies in personnel and processes. Don’t Work Too HardI can recall a conversation I had with an associate who
was literally in fear for his life. He was a very aggressive worker who was
raised to believe that hard work found it’s own rewards, whether that was in
the form of monetary remuneration or the satisfaction of a job well done. He
had been on the job only a few months when he was approached by a vigilante
committee of fellow workers, who
subtly let him know that he was causing problems in the workforce. They
informed him that he was working too hard making them look bad to management,
and that he should adjust his schedule and work habits “to slow down a
bit.” They did not threaten him with
any physical violence but the pure intimidation of the group of highly
educated “thugs” put fear in his heart. He soon discovered he had little
choice as he felt that Ali Baba and the Forty Thieves were now watching his
every action. As I recall, he soon found other employment outside of defense
work. Make A Living on the TaxpayersOne of the most startling discoveries I made in my first
few years was that many of my associates all seemed to run businesses on the
side during our normal 9 to 5 work day. One friend was buying up old houses,
accomplishing a few necessary repairs, and then renting the houses out to
tenants. This was all before the California real estate boom of the 1970s
when real estate could still be purchased for a song. I’m sure he’s a
millionaire today, by employing the tried and true spirit of applying
American enterprise at taxpayer’s expense. Where did these employees find the
time to spend on all of the phone calls and visits, you might ask? Since the
organization was terribly fragmented (with thousands of employees working on
a single project) and most of the managers incompetent, I would estimate that
the average low-level employee worked 2 hours per day for 8 hours of pay. Now
I know that aerospace managers who read this book will retort, “That attitude
was in the old days,” but I still have friends in the industry who confirm
for me that the situation is still as bad or even worse today. The sad part
of this situation is that the average defense worker does not understand how
the “real world” functions, believing that they put in an honest day’s work,
as many of these employees have never worked outside of that industry. Cost Plus ContractsOften, the government negotiates “cost plus” contracts with
defense contractors instead of fixed price contracts, as the costs of some
projects cannot reasonably be determined at the start of a complex project.
Government representatives negotiate a set of predetermined costs for all
efforts reflecting the acceptable labor rate for engineers or managers, the
overhead rate, etc., and then include a profit of let’s say 7%. Then the
contractor simply collects the hours worked, adds all of the fudge factors
including the profit and bills the government. It would seem that you can’t
get rich on a profit of 7%, but defense contracting firms quickly realized
that they could make the bottom line much juicier when they could justify
10,000 employees on a project instead of the 1,000 employees that were
necessary to realistically complete the job with a lot less communication
problems, I might add. During the process of developing a new design, when
various options existed in materials or equipment, I don’t think I ever heard
the term “cost effective” used in conversation. Money was no matter. Only the
best for the government, even if numerous lower cost options were available
that would accomplish the mission equally as well, but were never
investigated. Escaping To the Private SectorWhen I finally left the defense business in disgust after
17 years to accept a job as a Director of Data Processing for a major food
processing company in California, I was not prepared for the reality that
awaited me. After watching huge outlays of money for seemingly idiotic
expenses in defense work, I can recall being called on the carpet by the
quintessential “old man” who ran the company because he took issue with a $15
subscription I had approved for a computer trade journal, even though my
budget was a few million dollars per year. I quickly altered all of my
attitudes about money just to survive in the commercial sector. The people in
my department worked their tails off, too. It was not unusual for everyone to
work 18-hour days just to get the job done – something I had rarely witnessed
in defense work. In addition, I was running a small computer department of
less than 30 people, but I had complete control of the efforts of this
Fortune 1000 company as opposed to being some small cog trying to fight an
uphill battle on a meaningless project consisting of 10,000 or 20,000 people
who often worked against each other to achieve political gain. My small group
was the essence of America. The environment was challenging and invigorating.
I enjoyed working 18 hours per day as opposed to being one of the
clock-watchers in the defense business who counted the seconds until it was
Miller Time. True incentive is squelched in defense work, as your role is so
insignificant that your achievements can only be measured in tiny incremental
steps. Let’s move on to a few of the thousands of outrageous
examples of the waste of our tax dollars. The Bradley Death TrapMany of us have probably watched the made-for-TV movie,
“The Pentagon Wars”, in which the costs (over $14 billion) of developing the Bradley
Fighting Vehicle for the U. S. Army skyrocketed totally out of control. Air
Force Lt. Col. John Burton was assigned to evaluate the usefulness of the
Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicle, an Army troop carrier/scout vehicle that
was in reality a deathtrap for its crew. Burton kept trying to prove whether
it was an effective weapon and safe for its crew, but he was constantly
harassed by his temporary commanding officer, an Army General, so this
individual could get the Bradley into production and then into the field
after years of foot dragging by all involved. Through chicanery and backdoor
politics, the Colonel was finally able to demonstrate the problems with the
design, to no avail. When the Israeli Army purchased the vehicle, they made
all of the changes recommended by the Colonel. Unfortunately, this is not an
isolated incidence. In blunt terms, there is no accountability for taxpayer’s
money – there is only accountability through the political chain of command.
To spend $14 billion to continuously STUDY one weapons system is outrageous.
On top of that, the vehicle has the complexity of a can opener. With that
huge expenditure of money, they should have had thousands of the vehicles in
the field plus they should have found the cure for cancer. Do you think this
stupidity would have been permitted in the private (commercial) sector? More heads would have rolled then in the
French Revolution. Oh, yes, I believe the Army General responsible for this
fiasco was promoted immediately after this incident. Makes sense to me. Still worried about tax cuts? The $700 Toilet Seat
As a much smaller example of typical government
procurement costs, most of us have heard about the government spending $700
to purchase a toilet seat. In actuality, it was not a toilet seat; the item was a molded fiberglass
cover for the sanitary tank on a P-3 aircraft with a toilet seat molded into
the cover. In this one case, the price is not quite as preposterous as we
first thought, so it was not a good example of failings of the bureaucracy. But let’s
understand a few basic principles of military procurement. Government rarely
has the opportunity to purchase their hardware and equipment from Joe’s
Hardware Store. In the first place, many of the equipment items are only used
on missiles, aircraft or ships or by the armed forces in the field. Military
equipment, whether it is a jet engine or only small screws, has to pass
certain tests that would never be necessary in the commercial sector. For
example, even little screws must be shock tested so if a rocket explodes near
an aircraft the equipment held by these screws doesn’t come flying off of the
bulkhead decapitating a crewmember. Under
procurement regulations, a Request For Quote (RFQ) is submitted to three
qualified bidders before the purchase is awarded. The concept of three
bidders is designed to avoid nepotism wherein their pals get rich from
fulfilling all of the contracts. A package is prepared containing the
description and quantity desired for the item, the applicable military
specification that defines the requirements for the item in excruciating
detail, delivery schedule, and any software requirements (material
composition, shock testing, etc.) that define the paper work that must be
submitted with the hardware. Now the
time required of the prime contractor plus the labor and material costs for
the subcontractor to fulfill the order leaps astronomically just to procure a
few screws. Let’s be honest. Some of this meticulous preparation is necessary
to ensure a weapons system that will perform as designed. However,
innumerable changes can be made in this process to drastically lower the
costs of procurement. For example, eliminate the requirement for multiple
bidders on purchases less than $1,000. When Al Gore was Vice-President, he
elected to tackle the procurement bureaucracy to effect change. The last
thing I remember was Al Gore putting his tail between his legs and running
for cover. When you examine the contracts given to Halliburton in
Iraq, this multiple-bidding process was bypassed. Many of Halliburton’s
contracts are classified as sole-source procurement. I can just imagine what
the justification is for this flagrant violation (see Halliburton – It’s
Nice To Have Friends below). The procurement organization is simply one of the cogs in
the government’s gigantic bureaucracy. The Contract Award ProcessWhen I was the Assistant Program Manager, one of my
primary responsibilities was to act as liaison with the U.S. Navy, which
required that I interface with virtually every department within the shipyard
consisting of over 5,000 employees. These departments included estimating,
engineering, material control, procurement, accounting and contracts
administration. I had a very unique situation rarely enjoyed by the vast
majority of defense contracting employees, as I had a ringside seat to the
circus that was unfolding. The majority of large-scale defense procurement items go
through a competitive bidding process often involving two or more prime
contractors. The government sends out Requests for Proposals (RFPs)
stipulating the requirements for a new weapons system to multiple bidders.
Generally, these requirements are in the form of a “performance”
specification to avoid specific details that are better placed at the
discretion of the contractor, if for no other reason to avoid cost extras at
a later date if any changes are necessary. By performance specification, this
term means that the government stipulates the parameters by which the new
system must function, such as it must fly at the speed of Mach 2 at 50,000
feet, carry a bomb load of 10,000 pounds, and have at least one toilet seat.
The potential bidders then submit a truckload of documents justifying their
proposal. The process in actuality is really quite simple in concept. By
soliciting multiple bids, hopefully the government will get the most bang for
its buck. Generally, the low bidder is awarded the contract assuming they can
theoretically guarantee the government that they will satisfy the performance
specifications, unless of course political considerations impact the decision
process, as in “My brother-in-law Bernie needs the work.” Now that the defense contractor has won the award, where
do they get the tens of thousands of employees they supposedly need to
fulfill the contract? Assuming that
Wingless Aviation lost the bid, half of their staff then updates their
resumes, spit shine their shoes and go galloping off for an interview with
the winner, Politically Connected Aviation. This is how it works in the
defense business, with worker bees moving from one defense contractor to
another just to survive. And often the winning and losing companies may be
thousands of miles apart, forcing these pathetic souls to move their families
lock, stock and barrel within a few weeks. The concept of loyalty is
destroyed forever. Find Those Costly Errors! - I was a part of the
proposal team for a new class of Amphibious Assault or helicopter assault
ships (LHA). After Litton Industries was awarded the contract to build the
ships, I can vividly recall that 30 or so people I worked with were yanked
from the primary jobs and merged into a new group that you might assume was
created to refine the design or start the process of ordering equipment. No, the purpose was far more sinister.
Their function was to immediately start the process of finding the gaffes in
the drawings and design specifications, so they could nail the government for
more money. Normally, in most morally bound commercial environments in which
I have worked, when problems were discovered and no work around could be
found, then and only then was the customer asked for more money. But not in
defense work – stick it to Joe and Mary Taxpayer within days after contract
award. At about the same time, I’m sure purely coincidentally,
Senator John Stennis, Chairman, House Armed Services Committee, was actually
able to get the government to pay for a spanking new state-of-the-art
shipyard in Pascagoula, Mississippi to build these ships. I assume he played
that familiar old song and dance, “it was necessary for the national
defense,” or some equally ludicrous hogwash. We have probably all heard the jokes regaling, “Would you
want to fly in a plane built by the low bidder?” By the time the downtrodden defense contractor has finished the
contract, plenty of money has been allocated over and above the original bid,
resulting in far more money becoming available then will ever be needed, with
stacks of gold bars left over. The Engineering Change Proposal – When defects were
found in the drawings or specifications (and they ALWAYS were), it was the
responsibility of the contractor to prepare an Engineering Change Proposal
(ECP) justifying the necessary change including precise definition of the
wheelbarrows of money that would be required to correct the omission. The most insignificant defect was pumped up to make the
proposal read as if the moon would crash into the earth unless the four
screws that were missing from a drawing were not added to the design at a
cost of thousands and thousands of dollars. These ECPs often ran into
hundreds of pages to support insignificant changes in order to justify the
expense. At this point, you are probably asking the question,
“Well, didn’t the government see through this charade?” The answer is not in your lifetime. We
have to remember that in government bureaucracy the main arbiters of the
money are auditors who knew nothing of the technical scope of the proposal.
Without getting too in-depth into how these proposals were priced, it isn’t a
simple matter of just telling the government that the screws cost $500 and
the labor (because so many departments were affected by the change) was
another $50,000. No, no, it deliberately gets much more involved then that.
You have to add in factors such as the burden rate and the overhead, formally
known as General and Administrative (G & A). Overhead, which includes
company-wide costs such as security services and printing costs that are
evenly distributed throughout the company, is then calculated as a uniform
percentage and added onto the bottom line of every proposed change. This
proposal is submitted to a technical government representative who says “yes”
or “no” as to the validity of the change. I can recall a specific incident wherein the government
auditors were challenging the company on the pricing of a number of
proposals. Since the auditors were not engineers and therefore not
technically competent, when they reviewed the proposals they rarely could
challenge the need for 4 screws, 2 widgets and 17 gotchas – all very
complicated stuff. So human nature dictates that they would find their
comfort zone and challenge the percentages used for the contractual labor
rate or the overhead rate. Numbers they could understand – for after all, they
were accountants. Many hours were spent debating whether the overhead rate
was .07654 or .07655 percent. Rarely was the basic premise challenged about
the screws costing $50,000, so if you multiply .07654 or .07655 times $50,000
instead of the contractor charging the government the actual cost of a few
thousand dollars, the resulting difference between these rates was a trifle.
But it made the government auditors pound their chests in triumph for they
believed they had won the battle. The axiom about the forest and the trees
immediately comes to mind. Still worried about tax cuts? The B-2 Bomber – The Ultimate BoondoggleOnce again the government lets defense contractors dictate
the price of weapons systems at any cost to the taxpayer. The relatively new
B-2 Bomber has a price tag of about $2 billion per copy. Original estimates
projected a cost of $270 million per plane. According to the Bulletin of
Atomic Scientists, “the plane is currently worth five times its weight in
gold.” Are we crazy to let this ridiculous pricing happen without screaming
and shouting? Naturally, the head of
the U.S. Air Force responded with the typical quote to justify outlandish
expenditures, “Its worth every penny if we save one American life.” Saving American lives is not the issue –
this is typical military subterfuge - the issue is why do we need to waste
incredible sums of money on very questionable, or in some cases, very badly
conceived and wasteful projects. Oh yes, we were force fed the propaganda
about its infinitesimally small radar signature due to its revolutionary
shape, which of course is really just an advancement on the “Flying Wing”
invented by Northrup Corporation in the 1950’s. The reason for the B-2 bomber
was to avoid the radar systems so we could bomb the hell out of our
archenemy, the Soviet Union, which no longer exists. Now I guess we can use
these planes to bomb the border with Mexico to stifle illegal immigration. After spending gazillions of dollars to develop this
state-of-the-art aircraft, the designers have the gall to tell us that
because of the very expensive materials used to deflect the enemy’s radar,
the plane must be housed in climate-controlled hangars and have become a
maintenance nightmare. This pathetic solution would only be permitted in
defense work. In private industry, the manager would soon be sweeping floors
if he had the audacity to suggest that design even in jest. On top of that,
rumors were flying that the B-2 melted in water. The Air Force actually flew
a busload of newsmen to its base in Missouri so these people could watch Air
Force personnel wash the planes. Under actual battle conditions, of course,
the enemy would never realize that simply bombing the aircraft hangars
immobilizes the entire fleet. It becomes painfully obvious that’s why the Air
Force stationed the B-2 in Missouri, the geographical heartland of the
country. I can just see it now - all of the air conditioning technicians will
need secret clearances just to adjust the thermostat in the hangar. You would
not believe the justification that the Air Force uses for continuation of the
B-2 program. It’s so preposterous that you would need to wash my mouth out
with soap if I repeated their claims. As unbelievable as it may seem, over the last 5 to 10 years on
occasion Congress has still been trying to get 9 more of these behemoths
built for $27 billion – that’s $3 billion per plane! The excuse, as always,
is they are needed to defend our national security. How? By bombing Al-Qaeda
terrorists on their camels on the Pakistani border? We all know it has
nothing to do with payback – paying back the large political contributions of
the aerospace industry and Northrup Corporation in particular. Congress
killed the last authorization attempt, but I have no doubt it will raise its
ugly head again in the near future. Anyone who has ever worked in the manufacturing business, especially
defense manufacturing, should be rolling on the floor in hysterical laughter
at the $2 billion price tag per plane, and then choking on the fact that
Northrup has the unmitigated gall to try and charge $3 billion per plane for
most likely newer versions that may have changed by 1/10th of 1%.
But wait a minute. Maybe the newer versions have a stick shift or perhaps two
toilet seats? The reality of weapons
system development is that buckets of money are spent during the development
stage to ensure the product performs as required and to debug the product.
New materials must be investigated and incorporated into the design,
engineering drawings developed, jigs and fixtures prepared, castings and
molds developed, new equipment fabricated, computer software designed, and
then the entire kit and caboodle is tested and re-tested. Let’s look at this
rationally by removing all of the hype. Once the Air Force takes possession
of the first stallion of any new weapon system, the hard work is done.
Thereafter, any subsequent follow on orders should be much cheaper as the
bulk of the design work; drawings, manufacturing processes, software
development and debugging and testing have been completed. Talk about pulling
the wool over the government’s eyes. To make a reasonable comparison, one B-2 bomber costs the
same as a sparkling new aircraft carrier, a small city on water, over 3
football fields in length, 13 stories high, and home to 5,000 men and women. Let’s put this one unnecessary expenditure in perspective as far as
you and I are concerned. The United States has about 100 million people who
pay taxes. The savings to the taxpayer from eliminating just this one B-2
boondoggle would theoretically put $270 back into each taxpayer’s pocket.
Give me the defense budget for 30 days and I’ll cut it so much it will enable
the tax collector to eliminate everyone’s tax liability. Still worried about tax cuts? The F/A-22 Fighter – the RaptorAnother overly hyped program, that has been under
development since the cold war with Russia, is the F/A-22 Raptor jet
fighter. Par for the course, the Raptor
costs six times what the F-15 costs, the plane it is designed to replace at
an astronomical cost of $351 million per plane (over a quarter billion
dollars per plane – what lunacy!). Even the recent versions of the Russian
MIG fighter, which few countries possess, is the only plane that can stand up
to the F-15, the supposed antiquated fighter. And of course, the original
estimates were that the F/A-22 would cost about $70 million per copy, even at
that number an outrageous amount of money. Republicans in Congress tried to
kill the program in 1999, to no avail. No country has an air force even vaguely approaching the
power of the U. S. Air Force. The Air Force’s command of the skies is
unchallenged. Just like the B-2 Bomber, the Raptor is designed to avoid enemy
radar and to shoot down Russian fighters. The plane has the ability to not
only drop smart bombs but it also can capture enemy intelligence as it flies
at well over 1,000 miles per hour. I wonder if it performs well in the rain? The F/A-22 project was conceived as a “cost plus”
contract, which roughly translated means “milk the taxpayers,” because Joe
and Mary Taxpayer pay for all cost overruns. Why is this contract still
roaring ahead full bore? That’s because the prime contractor, Lockheed Martin,
managed to find 1,000 different contractors to provide parts in 43 different
states to share in the kill. The Congressmen and Congresswomen who approve a
contract of this magnitude are all too eager to claim they were responsible
for bringing the work to their district. The plan is to procure 277 planes at a total cost of $71.8
billion. Twenty years ago, the Air Force planned to build 760 Raptors at a
cost of $35 million per plane. Ten years ago, the proposal changed to 438,
then 339 and eventually to the 277 planes at $351 million each today. One of the reasons cited for the huge increase in cost is
because the plane’s avionics, designed to sight an enemy aircraft far beyond
the pilot’s field of vision, “did not work as planned and it took us a while
to figure out,” according to Lockheed-Martin. For the costs of the program to
escalate so phenomenally, Lockheed-Martin must have 10,000 people working 24
hours a day to figure out that little problem. In March 2004, the Government Accountability Office stated
that flight tests indicated that the Raptor was not meeting its requirements
for a reliable aircraft. Still worried about tax cuts? The C-17 – Another Bomber FiascoThe C-17 AirLifter is the latest addition to the U. S. Air
Forces global airlift capability. The C-17 was preceded by the C5A, one of
the most scandalous programs in government procurement history. But I won’t
delve into that program, as it would take another book to explain that
ultimate mismanagement. The C-17 is a four-engine cargo jet that can land on
short landing strips in remote parts of the world and drop airborne troops.
Since the day the contract was originally awarded to McDonnell-Douglas, it
was plagued by technical ineptness and cost overruns. In 1994, the Pentagon
put McDonnell-Douglas on probation due to flaws in the design and postponed
the program. In fact, McDonnell-Douglas performed so badly (that’s saying
something for a defense contractor) that they were taken over by Boeing. The C-17 program has so many perverted twists that it’s
virtually impossible to list them all in this limited space. In many ways, it
almost makes the B-2 Bomber look like the picture of management perfection.
One item stands out like a sore thumb. The former top Air Force acquisition
official, Darleen Druyun, who is often referred to as the “Godmother of the
C-17,” accepted an executive position with Boeing after she was instrumental
in redirecting the Pentagon’s acquisition of the C-17 aircraft. It should be
mentioned that Boeing hired two of her relatives during the negotiation
period. She was convicted in April 2004 of a Federal conspiracy charge when
she told Boeing that their prime competitor, Airbus, underbid them by
billions of dollars for the refueling tanker lease-purchaser agreement,
offering the company an opportunity to resubmit their bid. If you thought there isn’t some grand collusion between
the government and its contractors, according to the Project On Government
Oversight, from 1999-2002, there have
been 36 instances of misconduct or alleged misconduct by Boeing resulting in
approximately $358 million in fines or penalties, restitution, and
settlements. How do they afford these huge fines? Excessive profit, my friends, simply excessive profit. Here are some of the more pertinent facts about the C-17
program: ·
The General Accounting Office (GAO) says that the Air
Force has enough C-17s to thwart the Air Forces’ effort to keep adding these
“Spruce Gooses” to the defense appropriations bill. ·
An illegal proposal has been kicking around that puts
the government in the business pf subsidizing a commercial version of the
plane that Boeing can then sell to private air haul companies. The theory
being that this “sharing arrangement” will reduce the purchase price of
future acquisitions. And if you believe that costs will be lowered, I have a
bridge I want to sell you. As a part of this deal, Boeing wants an exclusion
from certain laws that requires them to provide financial data related to the
program. Excuse me, can I hear that one again? ·
Russia’s equivalent to the C-17, the An-124, can
carry 85 percent more payload than the C-17X. ·
The major advantage of this aircraft over military
versions of the Boeing 747 or other competitors is that the plane can land
and takeoff on a 3,000 runway. Excuse me - that’s 3,000 feet on a dry runway.
It’s 6,300 feet when it rains which kind of negates the very purpose. Here we
are talking about the rain again. You might think that these are the same
people who designed the B-2 Bomber, or maybe it’s just a plaque that affects
all defense contractors. ·
In 2003, the Air Force restricted one-third of the
fleet to only fly within the continental United States due to continual
technical problems. Still worried about tax cuts? Marines Deploy Disastrous V-22 Osprey Hybrid Aircraft to IraqThe V-22 Osprey, half airplane and half helicopter, has been under development by the Marines Corp for what seems 10,000 years, because they are unable to make it work satisfactorily in a combat situation. Even though it is recognized by many experts that the entire program is unworkable, the Marines, who have already spent over $20 billion in development, and plan to spend $54.6 billion on acquisition, keep pushing the program. It doesn’t bother the Marines that the V-22 costs three times as much as a modern helicopter and almost as much as a fighter jet, but who cares, it’s only taxpayer money. As of April 2007, they plan to deploy the V-22 to Iraq with severe limitations. To-date, testing of the V-22 has resulted in the deaths of 30 civilian test pilots and Marines in three test flight crashes. Many more have been involved in less catastrophic incidents including fires, stalled engines and software snafus. The idea of the aircraft is that it will replace the Vietnam-era helicopters many Vietnam veterans will always remember that were used to ferry troops into combat. The C-46 and “Huey” helicopters were easily shot down (over 5,000 lost in Southeast Asia) but at least had the ability to make erratic moves to quickly get out of harm’s way. The simple idea for the V-22 aircraft is that it can ferry troops into combat and speed away before being shot down. But that’s not reality. The plane is so badly designed that the Marines Corp has placed severe limitations on its use in combat. One of the major problems is that prop wash can cause the V-22 to roll over and head into the ground. So when the plane is used in Iraq, pilots cannot exceed 9 miles per hour and land in a straight line. It will take Al-Qaeda about 15 minutes to learn how to shoot down the aircraft just like the traps that were laid by the Viet Cong for the Huey’s in Vietnam. The downdraft is so strong that it can create “brownout” conditions, making it difficult for pilots to see and potentially knock down Marines on the ground. Critics point out that in the heat of battle, V-22 pilots will forget about the severe limitations and react in ways that will crash the hybrid bird. A report by the Center for Defense Information stated, “The V-22 cannot do radical evasive maneuvers, but that’s what it will need for combat.” The Marines, apparently defying all reasonable tests of logic, cite that the V-22 can fly twice as fast as the C-46 helicopter that it is replacing, can carry three times the payload; is six times more survivable; and is quieter than a conventional helicopter which can be heard for miles. But the V-22 has many very basic design flaws that prohibit its usefulness. Safety is one issue. The 24 troops it is designed to carry would all drown if the V-22 went down in water because egress is very limited. If it loses power below 1,600 feet, the aircraft becomes a coffin for the occupants. The bottom line is that when on duty in Iraq, the Marines will use the V-22 to ferry troops from one safe location to another. In other words, it’s an incredibly expensive truck. Why are the Marines and Bush administration still pushing this program? The Boeing Company and Bell Helicopter Textron are the main contractors (let us not forget about their generous campaign contributions). The work on the program, although very inefficient and prohibitively costly, is spread over 40 states and 2,000 subcontractors. More than 100 members of Congress formed a Tiltrotor Technology Coalition to protect the program. When Marines start dying in Iraq because of the aforementioned problems, we’ll hear lots of flimsy excuses for their deaths, but the reality is the program should be cancelled. Still worried about tax cuts? Boeing Strikes AgainAs a part of Homeland Security, the Transportation
Security Agency (TSA) awarded a contract in 2003 to Boeing Corp. to install
7,000 explosive detection devices at 429 commercial airports in a 7-month
time frame around the country. The original contract was for $508 million but
TSA made 54 changes (probably relatively minor at that) to the contract that
raised the final price to $1.2 billion with 18 months to accomplish the work
– par for the course in government work. Remember my previous references
about how contractors milk those changes. The Homeland Inspector General investigated the Boeing
charges on the contract and found that Boeing had billed $82 million as
project manager for actual costs of $39 million. Of course, Boeing responded
with the standard canned line that Boeing did a job that people said could
not be done. Was he referring to the simple installation of a black box at
over 400 airports for over a billion bucks? The Homeland Inspector General was also critical of TSA’s
expenses, including one lavish affair at
a posh Washington, D.C hotel in November 2003 to celebrate its 2-year
anniversary that cost the taxpayers $461,745, including $85,000 for a party
planner. It obviously was much more elaborate than your typical Tupperware
party. Still worried about tax cuts? Shoveling Wheelbarrows of Money At ContractorsThe way government shovels out money to these inept
organizations is the same as if you came home from work and said to your
spouse, “Hi honey, I got paid today and I’m going to take part of my paycheck
and use the $20 bills to light the backyard barbecue.” I’m sure your better half might
contemplate having you committed. The key here that people just don’t seem to understand is that
the bureaucrats could care less about how they squander the “government’s”
money (not your money). It doesn’t come out of their pocket. As far as they
are concerned, the government’s budget is measured in trillions of dollars –
it makes little difference if Joe Contract Official blows a few million or a
few billion bucks. It’s all just a drop in the bottomless bucket to the
mindless government officials. Whistle-blowers Recover Some MoniesAbout 20 years ago, Congress recognized to some degree
that private firms were ripping off the government for virtually all services
offered to the government including defense contractors. A whistle-blower law
was passed that allows concerned citizens the opportunity to expose the
contractors and to receive up to 25% of the monies recovered by the
government. Since its inception, the False Claims Act has been
instrumental in recovering nearly $12 billion for the government from such
industry giants as Tenet Hospital, Lockheed-Martin, TAP Pharmaceutical
Products, Boeing and KPMG-Peat Marwick. To protect the consumer after the corporate frauds of
2002, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed covering fraud against publicly
traded companies. The law targets those companies that destroy records,
commit securities fraud or fail to report fraud to investors. Do You Want More Information?If you would like more information on those weapon systems
that experienced overwhelming technical problems, cost overruns, or plain
just don’t work, use the Internet to research information on the following
programs:
Defense Programs Worth Investigating The Project On Government
Oversight (POGO) and Citizens Against Government Waste web sites contain very
well documented insight into all of these programs: I suspect I have offered enough
evidence about defense aerospace procurement mismanagement. It’s time to fry
bigger fish, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). NASA – Incompetence Par ExcellenceIf you think my previous statements about the work habits
and culture of government-funded work in aerospace were blasphemous, now I’ll
scrutinize the government-funded National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) culture that in many ways is even more sickening than
the typical aerospace work environment. NASA is a prime example of a government entity that
received too much money, which I’m sure every NASA official will dispute to
his or her dying days. NASA spent over $1 million to develop an instrument
that would write in space, I assume something akin to a ballpoint type pen.
The Russians, who in comparison have a pittance to spend on space, use a
pencil at a cost of $.04. A little history is in order. When the Russians orbited
the first satellite, Sputnik, in 1957, it rattled the very core of our
defense establishment. How could the Russians have achieved this breakthrough
over the Americans? When John F. Kennedy assumed the office of President in
1960, he stated we would land on the moon before the decade was out – we’ll
show those pesky Russians a thing or two. Our pride was wounded, so now it
was time to let out all of the stops. Was there any real concern of national
security to engage in a hastily prepared contest with the Russians to get to
the moon? Not really. The major peripheral benefit was scientific in nature
so we could learn how to fly in space to gain knowledge about our solar
system, but more importantly to salvage our pride. Knowledge is always
beneficial, but to throw billions of dollars at the problem was insane,
especially when you consider the problems we still have on the earth with
poverty, illiteracy and disease. What happened to our priorities in society? Eventually, in 1969, we made it to the moon to great
cheers from the peoples of the world. We went back a few more times, found
out the moon was NOT made of cheese, and that was the end of those trips. It
was time to go after bigger targets like Venus and Mars. We of course learned
much about space travel during that time that would make it so much easier
for deeper ventures into the solar system in the future. Well, at least
that’s what we thought. Four programs that NASA has completely bungled are 1.
The Space Shuttle 2.
Mars Climate Orbiter 3.
Mars Spirit Rover 4.
Genesis Space Capsule Let’s examine these stellar NASA
programs. The Space Shuttle – The Space Shuttle has been an
unmitigated disaster since its inception. Two shuttles, Challenger and
Columbia, have blown up with the tragic loss of two crews of 14 highly
trained people. Columbia accident investigators attributed the disaster to
the NASA work environment and a lax safety culture, and they recommended 15
reforms that must be carried out before the shuttle can fly again. To-date,
NASA claims to have implemented changes to satisfy 5 of those
recommendations. I assume we should not hold our breath waiting for the rest
of the changes. Keeping par with the defense industry, each shuttle costs
about $2 billion. Is this a magic number the defense contractors use to price
B-2 bombers, space shuttles and aircraft carriers? The space shuttle program,
which began in 1972, was supposed to cost between $10 and $12 million for
each shuttle launch, which somehow escalated to over $450 million. And the
turnaround time between flights, which was supposed to be days, somehow
became months, if launches were attempted at all. At least someone is solving the problem but not in
government. In September 2004, a bunch of comparatively rank amateurs
launched SpaceShipOne, a vehicle that can orbit the planet. Each launch is
realistically predicted to cost between $25 and $30 million. At about the
same time, the president’s space commission recommended that NASA get out of
the business of hauling cargo into space and leave it to private enterprise.
Within a few years no doubt, hopefully the same commission will recommend
that private enterprise handle interplanetary exploration as well. Isn’t it ironic that we are totally reliant on the “dirt
cheap” Russian Mir spacecraft to shuttle American astronauts back and forth
to the Space Station until such time as NASA gets their act together? Mars Climate Orbiter – In 1999, as the Mars
Climate Orbiter neared the red planet, after traveling 121 million miles for
over 9 months, it received instructions from earth to fire its main engine to
begin the process of orbiting around the planet. It executed the software command,
fired its engines and fell into an orbit around the planet. But it never came
around from the backside of the planet. $230 million was spent to build and launch the spacecraft
that was designed to orbit the planet and collect data on the daily weather
and atmospheric conditions, and then transmit that data to the Mars Polar
Lander. I guess we should be overjoyed to know that the Mars Polar Lander
wound up on the scrap heap of history, too. Why did this happen?
NASA, after intensive investigation, concluded that a catastrophic
error had occurred in the software that placed the spacecraft much too close
to the surface of Mars. Instead of orbiting at 125 miles above the planet,
the vehicle dropped down to 35 miles. Computer simulations verified that the
spacecraft likely wound up as fireball lighting up the Martian atmosphere,
but we couldn’t see it – it was on the other side of the planet. The $230
million investment was now a junkyard sale all over the Martian landscape. NASA stated that it was embarking on a program of
management improvement to avoid a repeat of that disaster. Let’s see how well
they fared. Mars Spirit Rover – In 2004, the Mars Spirit Rover
landed on the planet, moved off its landing pad, began transmitting data to
the earth, and then went silent. Another software problem was found to be the
culprit. During the flight to Mars, NASA decided to upload a spanking new
operating system (just like in a Personal Computer) to fix vulnerable
shortcomings in the original operating system. But they made a primitive
error that left some of the old programming code still active. Once NASA engineers realized the problem, they worked
frantically to revive the dormant spacecraft until finally they were able to
make the probe operational. I know its silly of me to ask the question, but “why was
the spacecraft launched if it was known that there were major problems with
the software?” Is it possible that
the political chain of command would not tolerate another delay? Genesis Space Capsule – In 2004, the Genesis
Space Capsule, which had orbited the sun for more than three years in an
attempt to gather clues to the origin of the solar system, crashed to Earth
after its parachute failed to deploy. This $260 million project was designed to collect space
particles on a series of very sensitive disks, which by the way many people
doubted would work at all. Here’s the nail in the coffin for this outrageous project.
They could not have the capsule accomplish a conventional parachute landing,
as the fragile disks would be damaged beyond repair due to the force of the
impact upon landing. So what did the geniuses at NASA decide? They opted to have some Hollywood stunt
men fly helicopters to snatch the capsule out of the air with hooks assuring
a soft recovery. The pilots had participated in dozens of practice runs but –
whoops - the spacecraft was tumbling to earth instead of the smooth descent
if the parachute had opened as planned. They were unable to retrieve the
capsule resulting in a smorgasbord of metal buried in the ground. NASA has
stated that they were able to recover some material from the now obliterated
disks, but scientists had planned to study the material for 5 years. Most
likely, they now have about a week’s work. Instead of using hooks to snag the
capsule, the American public would have been better off if the stunt men had
used butterfly nets to snag the NASA managers. Final Thoughts on NASAAccording to General Chuck
Yeager when he was asked about the problems at NASA back in the 1990s, he
responded: “Basically, the bureaucracy. It’s a civil service organization. It’s difficult to get dead wood out of it, it has a tendency not to let loose of operational programs and keep on doing research and development. The shuttle is a good example. We could probably run the shuttle program for about one-tenth of what it is costing today with a good civilian organization that’s in it to make a profit.” Note General Yeager’s comment about a “good civilian
organization,” and I don’t believe he was referring to one of the prime
defense contractors who milk the taxpayers, either. Has there been a shake-up of managers at NASA? No, of course not. The NASA budget for
fiscal year 2005 has just been increased to $16.4 billion as I complete this
book. I strongly suggest that they give us that money back in tax cuts until
NASA cleans its house and gets rid of the incompetent management team and
makes every effort to change it’s culture. Perhaps we could follow the
Russian practice and put a few of these rogues into Lubyanka Prison in Moscow
for 10 to 20 years. Maybe that drastic approach would shake up the snake pit.
As a final thought on NASA, we were been glued to the TV
set when the Hubble Spacecraft was launched to provide us with a vision of
the outer reaches of the Universe, of course at a cost of over $8 billion. Previously, we built gigantic complexes of telescopes in
obscure locations to view the heavens. Large sums of money were expended in the
process. Then how is it that amateur astronomers have been able to find
previously undiscovered Jupiter-sized planets using telescopes that can be
purchased in a typical Wal-Mart for a few hundred dollars? What have the astronomers been doing with
all of the money we’ve given them to design and build telescopes with mirrors
30 feet in diameter compared to the Wal-Mart telescopes which use optics 4
inches wide? Halliburton – It’s Nice to Have FriendsLet’s move on to Halliburton, Dick Cheney’s former firm,
and we’ll see how they have performed for the government. My intent was not to attack a specific government
contractor, as Halliburton has been beaten to death in the press. In my
experience many of these companies are all equally guilty of inept management,
gigantic cost overruns and unjustifiable expenses. However, Halliburton has
constantly been in the news because of their exceptional greed and
incompetence, so they are a good whipping boy to illustrate my point. Most of the contracts Halliburton has obtained from the
government have been sole source procurement, without a competitive bidding
process. Since the invasion of Iraq, Halliburton has seen their share of the
pie increase from $468 million to $3.92 billion (the government authorized
$30 billion in emergency money to fight terrorism), no doubt because of
certain influences in the White House.
Oh boy, the fox is in the hen house again. Obviously, Halliburton is not the only scoundrel making
off with tidy profits but isn’t someone watching over the hen house? That’s the job of the Defense Contracts
Audit Agency (DCAA), which rarely invokes its power to disbar a contractor
from doing business with the government. But DCAA did recommend in a
confidential memo that Halliburton should be suspended or debarred from
future government contracts. DCAA showed that one of Halliburton’s
subsidiaries, Kellogg, Brown & Root (KBR) could not account for $1.8
billion in charges out of a total of $4.3 billion spent on the LOGCAP (Logistics Civil Augmentation Program) III contract for the U.
S. Army to provide logistical support for our troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. $1.8 billion lost in the paper work? We’re not talking about losing track of
$3.14. Can you imagine running any business when you really don’t know why or
with whom you spent that kind of money?
It’s obvious that none of these clowns have ever worked in the private
sector. This is pure, unadulterated nonsense. When they spend that kind of
money there must be a paper trail in the form on invoices and checks, unless
the money was handed out in the form of cash. But that’s another issue worthy
of an in-depth investigation. In 1997, KBR billed the government for sheets of plywood
at $85.98 that actually cost $14.06 for work they did in the Balkans, plus
they billed to have their offices cleaned 4 times a day. The DCAA has charged
Halliburton for overcharging for fuel, food and other services they have
provided in Iraq, while the Justice Department is investigating business
activities they had in Nigeria and Iran. The Army paid KBR $750,000 for work
at a Fort Ord in California that cost about $125,000. What other mastodon
skeletons are hidden in the closet? Supposedly, the government is considering withholding
payments until Halliburton gets its act together. Considering withholding
payments? If this were the commercial sector, these guys would have been
kicked out the door a long time ago. So it doesn’t seem that I’m kicking only one subcontractor
in the teeth, how about Custer Battles, another contractor which provides
services in Iraq? Two managers inside
the company wrote memos exposing fraudulent billing practices, including
charges for nonexistent services or services provided at grossly inflated
prices. On top of that, former employees of the company are suing the company
for charging the Iraqi Coalition Authority $157,000 for a $95,000 helicopter
landing pad. Even better then that, they repainted a few forklifts, which had
been abandoned by Iraqi Airlines, and then charged the authority thousands of
dollars a month to lease those same forklifts. But the Pentagon has shown it
has some backbone and is withholding $10 million in payments. They actually
have barred the company from future contracts. I hope we can say with
confidence that this is Custer’s Last Stand. I wish to point out that it makes no difference which
political party controls the White House or Congress. The defense procurement
apparatus just keeps rolling along. Incestuous RelationshipsOne of the most malignant situations that occur in the
incestuous relationship between the government and contractors is that many
retired military officers and contracting authorizing personnel immediately
take high-level positions with contractors upon retirement. There is some
merit in this approach as who knows better about the workings of the
government then former officers, but the question must be asked, “What
benefit did these people provide to their new company while they were still
on active duty?” Why in reality one of these contractors would want to hire
the people who are equally guilty of the mismanagement of taxpayer dollars is
beyond my comprehension. But this
hiring occurs for no other reason then to exploit their contacts and
knowledge of government bureaucracy. Rarely Do Systems WorkDo you remember that during the first Gulf War, the
outlandish claims about the kill ratio of the Patriot Missile System, when
the generals were claiming that it had nearly a 100% kill ratio? After the war, it was proven that the
system was a dismal failure. How can this be? As another example, take the Antimissile System, which has
been under development while a number of administrations have changed hands.
According to the systems developer, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), the
system may be capable of hitting targets up to 80% of the time. The system is
designed to send interceptors into space to KO enemy warheads. It’s just
another drop in the proverbial bucket, but the government has spent over $130
billion on this latest venture into the Twilight Zone. Flight tests, to determine if the thing actually works,
have been delayed several times. It doesn’t take a brain trust to know with
each passing day more and more is being spent with each delay because the government
pays for these delays – not the contractor. These tests started in 1999 (5
years ago) with the accustomed failures that led to months of delay until the
failure point could be determined. Five hits were recorded in these tests,
but under very “controlled conditions.” As a final blow, the Operational Test
and Evaluation Office has had prolonged arguments with the developer, MDA,
over the likely effectiveness of the missile system. I’ll bet the kill rate will be great as
long as it doesn’t rain. The most ironic part of this total incompetence is the
fact that I have often heard company management officials use the empty line,
“If you want it to work the first time, it’s going to cost a lot of money.”
Since systems rarely work the first time out of the barn, then obviously we,
the taxpayers, are wasting our money. I wonder, “Can we ask for a refund?” Re-Thinking Weapon SystemsIt has been my observation that these systems are far too
complicated. Some bureaucrat sits in an office in Washington and says, “Gee,
wouldn’t it be great if the XYZ Missile could do loop-de-loops while in
flight to confuse the enemy. Let’s add it to the contract.” By my experience,
the official makes this decision without the slightest concept of how
difficult that afterthought will be to implement or how much money that
unnecessary extra may cost. For after all, the money isn’t coming out of his
or her pocket. The military uses the standard byline, “We need it to defend
the country,” to justify any outrageous expense. My response to that is
“malarkey.” There is no analysis of
Return on Investment (ROI) as is regularly practiced in the commercial world,
but a reasonable approach would be to design ten relatively simple weapon
systems with slightly less capability than one weapon system they can’t get
to work. In conjunction with that revised design philosophy we should demand
accountability for our monies and an honest days work from the defense
contractors. Keeping Track of InventoryOver the years, the government has procured billions of
items that are spread throughout the world. Supply Sergeants are responsible
to keep track of the inventory when an item is moved from point A to point B,
but sometimes an item becomes lost in transit. We can’t expect the Pentagon
to keep track of every little item, but somehow the Pentagon has lost track
of over $1 trillion (that’s trillion, not billion) dollars worth of
inventory, and we’re not talking about socks and razor blades either. We’re
talking about large ticket items like tanks, missiles and planes. The U. S.
Army alone can’t find 56 planes, 32 tanks and 36 Javelin missile command
launch units. I wonder if the Navy is missing any ships? But there is a
degree of continuity. The Defense Department has failed its annual audit for
seven years running. With just a little expeditious application of practical
management principles to scrutinize the pricing offered by these defense
contractors, and limiting the features that are integrated into the designs,
the Army, Air Force and Marines could have two or three times as many of each
weapon system to defend the country. In the limited space I allocated to digest the defense
contracting business, I was only able to whet your appetite as to the gigantic
waste of taxpayer dollars. I can assure you there’s plenty more in Housing,
Education and Welfare, Agriculture, and other departments, as well. |
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